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Information markets are mechanisms that allow a group of geographically dispersed participants to reach and 
continuously reevaluate consensus by discovering the value of alternative outcomes.  Evidence suggests that these 
markets can produce better quality decisions than a small subset of selected decision makers: a finding in direct 
opposition to the trust we place on expertise.  In challenging and uncertain decision-making arenas, information 
markets offer an interesting, and somewhat counter-intuitive approach.  In practice, information markets may be 
used in combination with other decision-making methods, but these market-based mechanisms offer many 
advantages.  This paper presents an information market typology and explores some of the challenges raised by 
different market applications.  Market types include event and estimation-based prediction markets, decision 
markets, and idea markets.  An integrated research landscape model and research propositions are presented to 
help guide continuing research in this area. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The overall message of information markets is that a large group of market participants can produce better quality 
decisions than a small subset of selected decision makers.  This is in direct opposition to our inherent trust in 
expertise.  Significant specialization and training, along with deep domain knowledge, are highly valued in society.  
The expert physician or diagnostician immediately leaps to mind.  However, there are many areas in which the track 
record of experts does not merit such high levels of trust.  In these challenging and uncertain decision-making 
arenas, information markets offer an interesting, and somewhat counter-intuitive approach.  In practice, information 
markets may be used in combination with other decision-making methods, but these market-based mechanisms 
offer many advantages such as feedback and signalling, participant anonyminity, and incentivised prediction 
accuracy. 
Information markets are mechanisms that allow a group of geographically dispersed participants to reach and 
continuously reevaluate consensus by discovering the value of alternative outcomes.  The technology behind 
information markets can support a large number of participants, engaging many people in the decision-making 
process.  The process itself is very democratic, with all participants enjoying equal access to  buy and sell their 
favored outcomes, typically in an anonymous market.  Information markets are less expensive mechanisms than 
face-to-face meetings or facilitated group consensus methodologies.  In addition, markets are able to operate 
continuously, thereby allowing participants to immediately respond to unfolding events.  Re-pricing based on newly 
available information makes markets  excellent feedback mechanisms that can be integrated into more complex and 
dynamic business processes. 
There are many different types of information markets that accomodate a variety of decision-making tasks.  Some 
markets are aimed at predicting the outcome of a specific event, while other markets are used for idea generation.  
Market designers have a rich pallette of options to choose from when adapting a market to a specific decision 
making context.   
This paper will first organize markets into a typology and define the various types.  We will then provide a research 
landscape model to guide future exploration of this topic area.  The landscape model defines and describes the 
relevant high level constructs. Finally, exemplar research propositions are presented to further explain how the 
typology and research landscape model can be used in information market research.  
II. INFORMATION MARKETS 
Berg et al. [2003, pg. 79] define information markets ―as those run for the purpose of using the information content in 
market values to make predictions about specific future events.‖  The overall goal of all information markets is to 
harness the collective wisdom of the crowds.  This notion is the topic of a recent book by Surowiecki [2004].  
Information markets effectively aggregate the opinions of participants with vastly different backgrounds, holding 
localized knowledge, who may be geographically dispersed [Sikora and Shaw 1998; Plott 2000].  There is a large 
body of evidence that information markets are effective at estimating the probability of future industrial or political 
events, such as shifts in monetary policy, predicting the next Supreme Court Justice to leave the bench, and 
assessing various forms of geopolitical risk [Berg and Rietz 2003; Brüggelambert 2004; Gruca 2000; Herron et al. 
1999; Oliven and Rietz 2004; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004]. The Iowa Electronic Market (www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem), 
perhaps the most well-known example, has compiled an impressive record of predicting presidential elections [Berg 
et al. 2001; Berg and Rietz 1996; Forsythe et al. 1992].  Several informal explanations for the success of these 
markets are presented in the prediction market literature.  Most notably, this literature identifies financial incentives 
for accurate predictions, better-informed traders self-selecting to participate, their ability to aggregate information, 
and the feedback provided by market price as critical success factors [Plott et al. 2002].  The initial popularity of 
these markets to forecast election outcomes [Berg and Rietz. 2003] has spread, and their use has expanded to 
many decision-making environments. Many companies have been using proprietary internal information markets for 
managing demand risk (Intel, Google), determining product ship dates (Microsoft), forecasting market capitalization 
prior to an IPO (Google), identifying breakthrough technologies (GE), and estimating effort for project management 
(USF Milestone Market) among other tasks.  Best Buy, Motorola, Qualcomm, Edmunds, and Misys Banking 
Systems have used Consensus Point, a commercial information market company, for a variety of prediction 
activities. Some other information markets are Economic Derivatives, News Futures, Foresight Exchange, and the 
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Hollywood Stock Exchange.  Predictify supports specialized and general trading on political, financial, current 
events, sports, and entertainment questions.
1
 
This expansion in use has spawned a variety of information markets designed to elicit the changing types of 
information required to reduce uncertainty.  Figure 1 presents a market typology that organizes markets by the type 
of decision making task.  Each of these market types is aimed at a different type of task, which often leads to 
different designs.  There are three main categories of information markets differentiated by the type of information 
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Figure 1.  Information Market Typology 
 
As indicated in Figure 1, information markets can be divided into two distinct groups based on their outcomes and 
whether these outcomes are verifiable or unverifiable.  Because prediction markets, by their definition, attempt to 
predict the state of a specific event at some future time, the results can be verified against an actual outcome.  The 
outcomes of decision-and-idea markets reflect the participant's choice among alternatives or breakthrough solutions 
that will not have comparable events with which the results can be verified.  A more detailed description of the 
various types of markets follows. 
Prediction Markets 
Prediction markets are concerned with forecasting the future.  Because these predictions will ultimately come to 
pass, the truth of the predictions can be verified.  Prediction markets are an increasingly common type of market that 
can be used in a wide variety of decision-making contexts. Most markets are event markets with binary, discrete and 
mutually exclusive contracts, such as bidding on the winner of a presidential election.  Recently, the choices and 
contracts have become more complex, allowing the bidder to select from any number of possible outcomes or 
outcomes that represent a continuous range of choices.  Prediction markets can be further decomposed according 
to the type of events being predicted.   
Event Markets 
Typically, event markets operate with a well-defined set of outcomes provided a priori to market traders.  Through 
implicit evaluation and explicit trades, the alternative outcomes are priced at varying levels, conveying the voice of 
the market.  In event markets, the outcomes are discrete outcomes.  Which candidate will win an election?  Which 
team will win a game?  Which of three delivery dates are most likely?  The truth of these questions are ultimately 
revealed as the actual events occur, changing from predictions to historical facts.  The election markets conducted 
by the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) and the Hollywood Stock Exchanges markets for expected box office returns 
                                                     
1
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are classic examples of this type of information market.  Other examples of this prevalent format are supported by a 
variety of platforms such as Economic Derivatives (economicderivatives.com), Newsfutures (newsfutures.com), and 
the Foresight Exchange (ideosphere.com). 
Estimation Markets 
Estimation markets differ from event markets in that the outcomes are points along a range.  An estimation market 
can be approximated by an event market by selecting a set of discrete points as a priori alternatives.  While this may 
be a straightforward method of handling quantitative outcomes, there is a risk of losing some useful precision and 
precluding traders from selecting the truly desirable alternatives.  There are many interesting situations in which a 
quantitative estimation market seems like a natural fit.  For example, project management revolves around time and 
cost estimates that are certainly quantitative in nature.  The Milestone Market (www.MilestoneMarket.org) is a 
prototype market built at the University of South Florida and is being deployed for project estimation tasks. 
Forecasting sales or any of a myriad of financial indicators, such as interest rates, that can affect the business 
environment provide other examples of estimation markets.  Plott and Chen [2002] successfully applied information 
markets in a more business-oriented experiment to forecast sales volume and the level of profit sharing at Hewlett-
Packard Laboratories. Their market results outperformed official internal sales forecasts 75 percent of the time 
[Ostrover 2005].  Although in this particular market, the choices were discrete due to the functionality of the market 
mechanism, the type of choices exemplify the potential of estimation markets to allow for continuous alternatives. 
Decision Markets 
Decision markets seek to support decision making in more uncertain environments.  Typically, their goal is to decide 
between alternative choices where there is not necessarily a clearly correct choice.  In decision markets, traders 
explicitly state their preferences for different outcomes through purchases of desired outcomes and sales of less 
desirable outcomes (at particular price points).  These markets help create the future because the results (the most 
preferred alternative) may determine an organization‘s course of action.  Prediction markets state the decision tasks 
in certain terms that can be verified once the actual event takes place.  This requirement is relaxed somewhat in 
decision markets, which can present alternatives that may not be evaluated in black and white.  For example, Intel 
and Google‘s demand forecast markets, and Starwood‘s markets to develop and select marketing campaigns 
represent variants of such decision markets.  A decision market for selecting marketing campaigns would involve 
describing in some detail fairly complex options and then proposing evaluation criteria that could be used to 
determine which campaign was actually the winner.  Given a limited marketing budget, it might be difficult to 
thoroughly investigate the performance of each alternative so that market accuracy can be assessed.  In fact, it may 
be impossible to reach high levels of certainty in many decision making contexts.  Yet, such decision markets can 
still be very useful in determining courses of action or selecting amongst a set of alternative outcomes in less 
structured domains.  All that is necessary are clear descriptions of the outcomes and an evaluation method that is 
perceived as fair by the participants, as well as capturing the actual usefulness of the outcomes in a practical sense.  
The limitation is the uncertainty in the final assessment since in many situations the actual merit of every alternative 
outcome may be unverifiable.  Ultimately decision markets are only as good as the quality of the decisions in 
practice. 
Idea Markets 
Idea markets or futures operate in even less-structured domains.  The intent of idea markets is information discovery 
similar to brainstorming.  General Electric has recently implemented what they call an ―Imagination Market‖ to 
identify breakthrough technology research areas to pursue.  It is likely that many of the alternative outcomes are 
never truly verified.  Again, successful idea markets require good descriptions of the possible outcomes and a fair 
evaluation method at the close of the market.  However, the challenges involved in representing alternatives and 
evaluating those alternatives in the future are more extreme.  In a brainstorming environment, there must be a fairly 
easy mechanism for proposing (and possibly removing) alternative ideas.  For example, the GE Imagination Markets 
have resulted in between 60 to 150 proposed ideas, but only around 50 ideas are actually realized [LaComb et al. 
2007].  In addition, each unique idea must be accompanied by some method of evaluation.  Any market-based 
solution must empower all, or at least many, traders to offer alternatives.  In such unstructured environments,  
market management becomes critical as the tumultuous process of both idea generation and trading is combined.  
At the close of the market, the evaluation of all the potentially diverse ideas presents an equally difficult set of 
challenges.  In the GE Imagination Market, more ideas were generated, ideas were easily visible to all who 
participated, and there was more participation than traditional idea-generation techniques, but the ranking of ideas 
using volume-weighted average price was no better than the rating and ranking of ideas by members of a leadership 
team [LaComb et al. 2007].  Customer facing markets have emerged such as Dell's IdeaStorm  [ideastorm.com]  
and Starbuck's, My Starbucks Idea [mystarbucksidea.force.com] which allow participants to post, review, and vote 
on product and service suggestions.    
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The market typology presented in Figure 1 serves to organize the different types of markets by the type of decision-
making task to be implemented.  These market types, from event or estimation-based prediction markets to the less-
structured decision and idea markets, offer many different areas for research.  However, these markets also share 
some common core characteristics.  Many of these core market characteristics include aspects of market 
participants, general market structure, and mechanisms for rewarding traders and understanding the market outputs.  
In the next section of this paper, as we consider the research landscape for information markets, we model the 
relationships between seven high level constructs: trader characteristics, organization characteristics, market 
environment, external information, trader behavior, market design and market outcomes.  All will be relevant factors 
as we study specific information markets.  For example, there has already been research on how trader 
characteristics impact trader behavior [e.g., Forsythe et al. 1998].  However, the typology of information markets will 
require quite different conceptualizations and measures for market outcomes, which include how the voice of the 
market, activities, and performance are measured.  These differences for market outcomes by market type are 
detailed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Differences in Conceptualization and Measurement of Market Outcomes, by Market Type 
Market Type 
Market Outcomes 
Voice of the Market Activity Market Performance 
Prediction  
    Event Discrete Choice Price # of Trades Accuracy of Prediction 
    Estimation Point Estimate on Continuous Curve # of Trades Accuracy of Prediction 
Decision Price of Alternative Choices # of Trades Subjective Evaluation of Decision 
Idea Price Ranking of Ideas # of Ideas  Subjective Evaluation of Realized Ideas 
III. INFORMATION MARKET RESEARCH LANDSCAPE 
Research into the use of information markets to assist with business decisions is rich with opportunities.  This paper 
presents a few of the potential research areas as they apply to a variety of information market applications.  Figure 2 
presents the research landscape model depicted as a model that was developed from existing information market 
literature, as well as new areas for exploration outlined in this conceptual paper.  The high level constructs and their 
relations in the topology represent an organization of ideas from information market research.  Information market 
research has investigated the relationships between individual trader characteristics, market environment, 
organizational characteristics, external information, market design, trader behavior, and market outcomes.  Table 2 
presents some examples of influential and key findings from this literature for each of the high-level constructs that 
make up our research landscape model.  In Figure 2 and the following text we identify instances of these high-level 
constructs that have already been studied and/or appear to be highly relevant to information market research.  
However, these instances are in no way intended to provide an exhaustive list.  The goal of mapping the research 
landscape at this stage in information market research is to help structure research efforts on information markets by 
organizing the results of past studies, as well as detecting those areas that need additional work.  Within the market 
topology, research and development issues are separated into individual trader characteristics, organizational 
characteristics, market environment, external information, trader behavior, market design, and market outcomes.  
Individual trader characteristics represent individual differences along a host of dimensions that include socio-
demographic items, cultural differences, risk profiles, work roles, and levels of relevant expertise.  Market 
environments consider the collective aspects of the traders, such as diversity and independence, as well as the type 
of market, the number of participants, and the length of time the market is open.  Organizational characteristics 
relate to the organizational and political environment surrounding the market application.  External Information 
relates to the amount, availability, and accessibility of relevant information, search costs, and even insider trading 
knowledge.  Market design factors include the trading interface and functionality choices to accommodate the 
various market types, the level of anonymity provided traders, aggregation and feedback mechanisms, as well as 
decisions regarding the payoff mechanisms proposed to reward participants.  All of these market constructs directly 
affect trading behavior.  Trader behavior is characterized by the participant‘s bidding strategy, level of participation 
or engagement with the market, and how accurately they trade.  Trading accuracy is measured against the ultimate 
market outcome that can be assessed objectively or subjectively contingent on the market type.   Additionally, 
market design choices will moderate the effects of individual trader characteristics, organizational characteristics, 
and market environment on trader behavior.  Finally, how a trader behaves will impact the outcome of the market.  
Market outcomes include the actual performance or results of the market, the volume of activity, and various other 
measures that result in the market conveying the combined wisdom of the participants or the voice of the market.  
The market outcomes will result in a feedback loop to the traders possibly altering their behavior.  These issues are 
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Figure 2.  Research Landscape Model  
Trader Characteristics 
All traders are not created equal.  Trader age, individual expertise, work roles, tolerance for risk, or even experience 
with online financial services may all affect participation in an information market.  For example, there is a well-
known difference between cultures in power distance: the extent to which individuals expect and accept the unequal 
distribution of power, and tolerate differences in a hierarchy [Hofstede 1991, 2001].  Market participants from 
cultures high in power distance may be reluctant to trade, or in non-anonymous markets, may follow the trades of 
individuals who have higher positions, rather than participate based on their own beliefs.  Some educational 
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backgrounds or work roles might result in more experience or even domain expertise.  Is this more relevant 
experience associated with more sophisticated estimation market trading strategies?  Individuals also vary in their 
tolerance for risk, which would certainly affect trading.  In short, individual trader characteristics are fundamental 
factors in understanding how markets might operate with a given set of traders. 
Organization Characteristics 
Markets do not exist in a vacuum.  Markets operate in organizational and political environments that will affect 
everything from market acceptance to individual trader activity.  For example, a decision has to be made about how 
to incorporate markets into business processes such as project management, marketing strategy decisions, or 
innovation development.  The structured outcomes of prediction markets may be more easily integrated into 
business processes (e.g., use the market to estimate completion times at the beginning of the project and at set 
intervals throughout the project) than the more complex outputs of decision or idea markets (which may be used in 
conjunction with existing processes, such as forecasting or brainstorming processes).  How is a trader‘s market 
performance perceived within the larger context of teams and management structures?  The methods used to 
publicize information market applications and recognize strong performance (or to keep less inspired performance 
private) are factors outside of the market itself that will cause participants to alter behaviors.  Organizational support 
and how the results of market applications are disseminated and used all signal the value of information market 
technology to participants.  Finally, the outputs of markets are used to change or enlighten existing business 
processes.  The nature and importance of the processes and integration efforts are also central factors. 
The type and level of incentives can vary within an organization.  At GE, multiple incentives are used, including small 
prizes for the best idea, best portfolio of ideas, and amount of participation, as well as funding to prototype the best 
idea submitted by a participant [LaComb 2007].  At Best Buy, the top trader in their prediction market for new 
product sales received a $200 gift certificate [Dvorak 2008].  What is an adequate level and type of incentive to 
facilitate trading, and participation?  For example, the effort required to study a problem, and make an informed 
decision may not be trivial.  What level of incentive is necessary to prompt participants to expend the effort required 
to form predictions?  Are there any incentives that would cause some market participants to trade in ways that 
influence the outcome in inappropriate ways?  Also, what impact do various incentive structures have on trading 
strategies and ultimately on the outcome of the market?  
Market Environment 
Applying information markets to new and interesting problems brings into play a variety of task types.  The degree of 
task complexity of the problem being predicted can vary significantly.  Unlike a simple event market predicting the 
outcome of a political campaign, where there is one correct choice among two choices, there are other markets that 
involve multiple contracts that may change over time, or even participant-generated contracts.  The market typology 
captures much of this task complexity from well-defined prediction tasks to idea markets that are used for 
brainstorming.  For instance, care must be taken in the choice and description of the alternatives in estimation 
markets with many contracts, or decision markets with several complex alternatives.  Additionally, the market 
developer must decide on the granularity of the contract ranges, what, if any, reference points to provide, and 
whether or not to allow the contracts to be modified as the market progresses.  Task complexity can vary within the 
various market types, as well as across market types.  For example, an estimation market can be used to select 
alternatives from a few possible contracts or to perform more fine grained predictions using a continuous range of 
alternatives. 
Participant selection is a critical factor in any market, especially if the market is small or the knowledge is 
specialized.  Participant traits that support an effective information market include decentralization, diversity, 
independence, and the number of interconnections among participants in the market [Holland 1998; Johnson 1999; 
Knight 1921].  Information markets are excellent mechanisms for bringing together many decentralized ―experts‖ or 
team members and subsequently sharing the group consensus through market prices.  By harnessing the power of 
information markets to aggregate diverse knowledge and expertise, the limitations of single-expert decision making 
can be avoided.  Diversity in market trader characteristics will have a direct impact on trader behavior.  This is a 
market characteristic, because diversity is measured in relation to other traders, and therefore, informs the selection 
of traders for a specific market.  Diversity of backgrounds and opinions is viewed as positive for information markets, 
because differing ideas and beliefs will drive trading [Surowiecki 2004].  If everyone had the same idea or belief, 
there would be no trading.  All traders would desire to buy and sell the same items, therefore no trades would occur.  
To facilitate a market, participants must have differing expectations regarding the value of a stock.  The old adage, 
―One man‘s trash is another man‘s treasure,‖ exemplifies this notion.  Without trader diversity, everyone would have 
the same belief and thus value their trash and treasure the same.  Also the ―no-trade‖ theory suggests that adverse 
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agents [Milgrom and Stockey 1982].  A very diverse set of participants may interact differently from those with more 
in common. 
Factors such as domain expertise and trading experience may influence market behavior.  Therefore, it is important 
to incorporate individual traits, evolving trading experience, and other factors specific to the particular context or 
market type.  However, involving the ideal set of market participants is not as critical as one may expect.  Including 
somewhat less informed, or even completely uninformed, traders in a market adds liquidity as they may buy and sell 
contracts at prices that more informed participants would hold [Plott and Chen 2002].   In fact, the attraction of 
markets is that they display high levels of efficiency even though individual traders may have biases and make 
mistakes [Forsythe et al. 1992; Oliven and Rietz 2004; Forsythe et al. 1999].  Participants must be free to act 
independently and express their personal opinions through trading behaviors. Participants need to be free from 
group pressures when forming their valuations.  Independent value formation reduces the influence of dominant 
opinions, one of the important advantages of information markets.  While independence is necessary to foster a 
unique perspective, it is also desirable to have interconnections between market participants to foster the exchange 
of individual information.  Although a diverse mix of traders may maximize the independence of market participants, 
it may reduce the interconnectedness of those participants, which could minimize the exchange of individual 
information.  The impact of these influences on trading strategies, level of participation and trading accuracy needs 
to be teased out. 
The level of competition or the number of participants in the market, should also have an effect on trader behavior.  
Berg and Rietz [1996] found that larger, more active markets with fewer contracts are more accurate.  However, 
reasonable performance has been demonstrated with small (i.e., thin) markets or markets with as few as 8 to 30 
participants [Plott and Chen 2002; Ortner 1998].  For instance, Chen et al. [2001] successfully ran laboratory 
experiments using information markets with fewer than 15 participants.  However, small markets do present some 
unique market design challenges.  A small market is more susceptible to intentional market manipulation or the 
subtle dominance of shared beliefs.  Additionally, market liquidity may suffer due to a limited number of trades 
offered because of the small number of participants involved.  Participants must be engaged and actively trading to 
generate enough data for informed estimates.  Future research needs to discover if there is an effect on trading 
strategies, participation and accuracy of trades with differing numbers of participants.  In other contexts, idea 
markets could be used as a brainstorming tool with relatively few participants or a much more widely deployed 
solution to capture ―out-of-the-box‖ thinking by employees at all levels.  Again, the number and type of participants 
will certainly affect such markets. 
The long-term nature of many information markets can be particularly troublesome.  Capturing the reaction to the 
changing environment is a benefit of using information markets over time, but it also poses challenges related to 
task descriptions.  Accommodating changes to the outcomes being traded becomes even more difficult to manage 
depending on market longevity.  How varying levels of complexity over time will impact trader behavior is a very 
interesting and as yet unexplored question. 
Many of the market environment factors noted above will directly affect market design choices, since the market 
technology requirements are different for the different types of markets, or may be used to support a market 
environment characteristic (e.g., anonymity of trading to maximize independence). 
External Information 
As the problems tackled with information markets become more complex the impact of external information that 
traders possess may be influential.  The knowledge a trader can use to inform market activity can be affected by 
existing expertise, individual bias in how that information is processed, the ability of the trader to adequately 
research and obtain publicly available information, and/or the participants‘ access to insider information.  High 
search costs or low information quality can force a trader to make uninformed decisions.  Of course, low quality 
information might even be supplied intentionally by competing traders.  The notion of insider trading is particularly 
significant with small markets that can fall victim to intentional manipulation by a few influential traders.  Also, some 
participants may have more domain knowledge regarding specific tasks.  For example, in software projects a 
database developer may have insight about an upcoming change to the database management system that will 
affect the completion of the project that is not known by the rest of the development team.  Such unique knowledge 
or insights can be reflected in trading behavior that captures new or additional information quickly and the results 
may influence the market outcomes.   
Trader Behavior 
Trading behavior can be characterized by the strategies bidders choose, their level of engagement or participation, 
and how truthfully they trade.  Trading truthfully implies that the bids posted reflect the bidder‘s true beliefs.  Trader 
 
 
Volume 25 Article 27 
297 
characteristics, market characteristics, access to external information, and market design all play a direct or indirect 
role in influencing the behavior of market participants.  Additionally, traders also react to market outcomes and 
market outcomes are in turn influenced by trading behaviors.  In any market, traders react to current valuations of 
contracts, especially in comparison with their own valuations, in order to decide whether a buying or selling 
opportunity exists. 
Future studies can attempt to identify the various trading strategies adopted by participants and what effect they 
have on market outcomes.  Likewise, we need to discover what engages traders to actively participate in the market 
and the result of differing levels of participation on individual successes and overall market accuracy.  Trades should 
represent the participant‘s true beliefs.  We need to investigate if bidders are behaving rationally when trading in 
effort estimates or other outcomes.  Does the level of trading translate directly into accurate market forecasts?  To 
what degree do individual errors influence the voice of the market?  Are trader values more elastic when predicting 
outcomes of future events as compared to purchasing a material good or service?  How are changes in task scope 
and variability in the environment captured by the market? 
Market Design 
The role played by information market design features is another important research area.  Choices made by market 
developers during the design of the market mechanism may have a direct effect on trader behavior as well as 
moderate the effects of individual trader characteristics, market environment, and organization characteristics.  We 
have identified six design considerations: 1) payoff mechanisms; 2) feedback instruments and notification frequency; 
3) methods to aggregate the trading activity; 4) the level of anonymity afforded to traders; 5) the determination of 
market closings; and 6) the basic features, functionality and appearance of the market. 
For information markets to be successful contracts must be clear, easily understood, and easily adjudicated.  As 
participants buy and sell contracts in a market, the price of the individual contracts forecasts the probability of each 
event occurring [Berg et al. 2001; Malinvaud 1974].  This equilibrium property of information markets acts as an 
opinion-aggregation mechanism, with supply and demand principles illuminating the group consensus.  The 
feedback provided by the prevailing market prices of the contracts allows bidders to learn from the actions of other 
traders and possibly modify their initial estimates.  This concept is well defined in the literature on common value 
auctions [Kagel and Levin 1999; Rothkopf and Harstad 1994, Dyer and Kagel 1996].  Wolfers and Zitzewitz [2004 
pg. 125] suggest that prediction markets ―provide three important roles: 1) incentives to seek information; 2) 
incentives for truthful information revelation; and 3) an algorithm for aggregating diverse opinions.‖   
A market must provide some motivation to induce truthful trading behavior.  Market participants must have the 
proper incentives to fully engage in the market, as well as to trade in a forthright manner.  That motivation is 
normally in the form of a monetary payoff.  Payoffs can be real money or virtual currency.  The ―real-money‖ markets 
follow the principle that forecasts will be better if traders risk their own money.  However, due to regulatory issues 
mainly surrounding state prohibitions on gambling, many commercial information markets have adopted the concept 
of virtual currency in which participants are awarded prizes or other intrinsic rewards rather than legal tender.  
Servan-Schreiber et al. [2004] compared the accuracy of information markets with real-money and virtual currency 
payoffs and found no difference.  Their conclusion is that real money is only one of many possible motivators such 
as the thrill of competition, reputation and community bragging rights, or prizes for the best forecasters.  There are a 
number of potential payoff functions that can be applied to the market.  For example, participants can be rewarded 
for holding the most winning contracts.  Other payoff methods can be based on the amount of credits (or monetary 
units) a participant has accumulated (the participant‘s bank).  One such method, referred to as the winner-take-all 
method, specifies that the payoff for owning a share of the winning contract at the close of a market is always a 
dollar ($1.00).  By using this strategy, we can interpret the prices of contracts as the probabilities that it will be the 
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The participant‘s bank is adjusted by Equation 2 and participants are either rewarded for having the largest bank or 
given a monetary reward that is some fractional percentage of their bank.   
Payoff functions are designed in conjunction with incentives to participate in order to reward traders, both intrinsically 
and extrinsically.  Research needs to be conducted to test the difference between real and play money rewards in 
the new business problem domain [Servan-Schreiber et al. 2004].   
We expect that feedback mechanisms, such as email alerts of changing market conditions, may have a significant 
impact on trader behavior.  Additionally, creating innovative new feedback artifacts may prove to be a fruitful area to 
investigate.  Similarly, the design of algorithms that summarize and  transform trading activity into information that 
can be provided as feedback to both traders and sponsors has limitless potential (and is represented explicitly in 
Figure 2).  The prevalent data generated by the market can show trends, the degree of consensus among 
participants, and much more.     
The influence of the level of anonymity afforded to traders must also be explored.  This is especially important in 
markets within small business units in which traders may be influenced by their close association with other traders.    
It may be difficult to maintain independence in the market and/or minimize impacts on trading if there are influential 
cultural factors like power distance that arise if participants are known to one another. 
Market designers must choose how to accommodate unique aspects of the different tasks being predicted in the 
various market types.  Estimation markets present new challenges with regard to trading interfaces and other issues 
such as extensibility.  If there are no discrete outcome options available for trading, the market interaction becomes 
more of a selection of points along a continuum.  The issues to be researched include the development of engaging 
human-computer interfaces that support these types of actions, how to handle potentially infinite points along the 
continuum, and how to allow the trading range to be expanded or reduced while the market is active.  Should there 
be more general long-term estimates with closing dates well in advance of the projected contract or should the close 
be dynamic?  How do you account for scope creep in the choice of contracts?  Should additional contracts be added 
to the market if it appears that the original contracts are no longer valid or as early estimate dates expire?  In most 
cases the alternatives are known at the start of the market.  However, one interesting challenge is to provide 
mechanisms for adding alternatives while the market is active.  It is quite natural for critical information to change 
during the course of a market.  For instance, injuries to key players may dramatically affect the prospects of a team 
winning a specific game.  At times it is not information about an existing outcome, rather a completely new 
alternative that must be evaluated.  What happens if a new candidate enters an election?  The new outcome may be 
simple or complex, but some method of adding the alternative to the market in a fair and equitable manner must  be 
provided.  In other words, markets may be designed to be extensible.  The challenge is to decide who can add new 
alternatives, how should traders be notified, and when should trading be opened?   
Idea markets also require unique design considerations.  One challenge is ensuring the adequate description of 
each alternative.  How is the quality of the representation to be judged prior to an offering in the market and how 
should modifications be handled once trading has commenced?  How are new offerings entered into the market, 
traders notified, and trading started or suspended in an equitable manner?  How are shareholders compensated if 
an idea is withdrawn?  Another potential problem is determining if two ideas are the same.  Market participants may 
use very different approaches to describe similar ideas.  How should these potential conflicts be detected and 
resolved?  How should the voice of the market be interpreted if two similar ideas are valued very differently?  Again, 
there are many human-computer interface issues and market administrative policies that would be fruitful areas for 
research.   
Finally, the design of the trading interfaces is critical and can draw on the many ways of organizing markets, such as 
auctions, private exchanges, or more complex arrangements, such as the various financial exchanges.  Whatever 
the market organization, the appropriateness of the trading interface will directly affect participation.  Interface issues 
can be even more important in the information market arena, because participants are casual traders, not 
professionals whose livelihood is linked to market use.  The type of information market also places different 
demands on the interface, from the ease with which someone can execute a trade to the analysis of current market 
conditions.  In addition, any markets that require dynamic changes to the choices will require much more involved 
administrative capabilities. 
Market Outcomes 
The ultimate goal of using a market is to gain knowledge regarding the consensus of the participants.  This 
consensus is what Surowiecki [2004] refers to as the ―wisdom of the crowds.‖  The voice of the crowd, or market, is 
the price of the representative contracts.  Ideally, these prices should predict the true outcomes.  One of the most 
difficult challenges in using information markets is determining exactly what the market is saying, because there are 
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many ways to aggregate the trading behaviors and prices [Pennock et al. 2001].  Plott and Chen [2002], used a 
volume-weighted price average (VWPA) to determine the most valuable contract and a single estimate: the voice of 
the market.  The volume-weighted price average was calculated for each contract (ci) in a market with a set of 
contracts (C).  Let qj be the quantity of contracts purchased and let pj be the price (the number of credits paid for 
each contract) in a single trade (tj).  The total cost of any trade is then pjqj.  Finally, the VWPA (vi) for each contract is 















As noted earlier in the market design section, additional data can be collected and manipulated to provide insights 
into participants‘ beliefs such as the volume, velocity, and bid ask spread of trades.  Each of these variables can be 
viewed at intervals or as they trend over time.  The activity or volume of trades may indicate the popularity of an 
estimate.  Looking at the spread between pending bids and asks could be interpreted as the level of (dis)agreement 
between participants‘ expectations.  A longitudinal review of the trade/bid/ask history can display the belief trends.  
The interpretation of the data provided by an electronic information market is unlimited.  For prediction markets that 
are verifiable, market performance can be measured by accuracy: how closely the voice of the market matches the 
actual result of the event or estimate.  For the unverifiable markets (decision and idea markets), the determination of 
the voice of the market, and what constitutes activity and market performance will be somewhat different from the 
verifiable markets.  For the decision markets, the voice of the market will be the price of alternative choices, similar 
to that for the event market, to identify the single desired choice.  For the idea markets, these prices will be rank 
ordered to distinguish the more valued set of ideas from those that are less valued.   Activity in idea markets is 
measured by the number of ideas generated, not solely by the number of trades, which is enabled by a market 
design that allows dynamic extensibility.  Finally, the market performance of both decision and idea markets are 
measured via subjective assessment, since no actual real world outcome is available for comparison.  In fact, in the 
decision market, the purpose is to create the real world outcome (i.e., decide what to do). 
IV. RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS 
As discussed earlier, the information market research landscape is rich and varied, and there are many areas that 
need investigation.  In the following section, we present an example of research propositions related to each of the 
constructs in our model.  See Table 2 for a summary of the key constructs.  The propositions demonstrate how 
specific research projects can continue to contribute to our understanding of information markets. 
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Information 
Proposition 4: When new, external information is available to all market traders, those 
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Proposition 1:  The economic culture of individual traders will impact their trader behavior. 
Baumol at al. (2007) and others recognize that although most of the world‘s nations have now implemented 
capitalism as their economic system, there are dramatic differences between types of capitalism.  Given that 
information markets are built on an information corollary to financial markets, it is unlikely that individual traders who 
have only experienced their nation‘s particular form of capitalism will view the market in the same way, and 
participate in the same way.  For example, if individuals have only experienced the kind of state-guided or oligarchic 
capitalism  described by Baumol et al. (2007), then those individuals may view markets as less free and expect 
market results to be dominated by established powers.  This will certainly affect global markets, such as international 
software development teams and the advantage of geographically dispersed participants. 
Proposition 2:  Organizational incentives to participate will impact the amount and quality of 
trader participation in the information market. 
As discussed earlier, organizations vary in how they use incentives to participate in information markets.  However, it 
is currently unknown how these incentives operate, both initially and over time.  Research in this area can leverage 
the large body of research on incentives from organizational behavior, and in particular, cognitive evaluation theory, 
which has found that tangible rewards that are contingent on performance can undermine an individual‘s existing 
intrinsic work motivation [Deci et al. 1999], as well as  reduce cognitive flexibility in problem solving [McGraw and 
McCullers 1979] and performance on complex tasks with difficult goals [Erez et al. 1990].    In some settings, it may 
be better to allow individual‘s intrinsic motivation to foster market participation. 
Proposition 3:  In idea futures-type information markets, market diversity and number of 
participants will impact market performance (number and quality of ideas 
generated). 
In prediction-type information markets, it is known that even small numbers of participants can result in acceptable 
performance [Chen et al. 2001; Ortner 1998; Plott and Chen 2002].  Regardless of the number of participants, 
diversity in the market is needed, in order to get variation in ideas and beliefs [Surowiecki 2004].  It is unknown how 
these two market environment characteristics impact market outcomes, individually and as an interaction, in idea 
futures-type markets.  This is particularly important because market participation does have a cost in terms of 
employees‘ time to consider the new ideas of others and create their own ideas.  At GE, employees who did not 
participate as well as those who did not participate very often cited as the main reason ―not enough time‖ (73 
percent for non-participants, 82 percent for low-participants) [LaComb 2007].  Knowing how many participants and 
which participants are typically needed for good performance outcomes would be an important help in market 
design. 
Proposition 4:   When new, external information is available to all market traders, those traders 
will differ in how that new external information impacts their trading behavior. 
It is known that individuals are biased in their processing of information [Tversky and Kahneman 1974].  For 
example, individuals may falsely believe that their preferences are widely held.  A particular bias of interest to 
information markets that operate over time concerns how individuals process new information in light of the prior 
impressions and judgments.  Currently, there is debate over the effects of assimilation (individuals are more 
influenced by and process more completely new information that is consistent with prior belief) and contrast 
(individuals are more influenced by and process more completely new information that is inconsistent with prior 
belief).  Research in a variety of settings provides support for both effects (e.g., Foti and Hauenstein [1993] in the 
performance evaluation context); thus, the information market provides an ideal context in which to explore this 
issue. 
Proposition 5:  Idea markets designed for anonymous trading will generate more ideas and 
greater participation than non-anonymous idea markets. 
The prime motivation behind idea markets is to support brainstorming by as many people as possible, so that all 
possible ideas, in particular those that represent ―out of the box thinking,‖ are raised.  Anonymity as a design feature 
can minimize trader fear of retribution for expressing or valuing ideas that go against the status quo [Hanson 2006].  
However, in groups with communication channels outside the market, identity information may be shared (as in the 
case of the GE Imagination Market [LaComb et al. 2007]).  As mentioned earlier, this may be particularly important 
in settings in which traders are from high-power distance cultures, in which individuals are likely to be more 
deferential to those with higher rank in the organization [Hofstede 1991, 2001]. 
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Proposition 6:   The best method for determining the voice of the market will vary by type of 
market. 
As noted earlier, the best way to determine the voice of the market is a key challenge for the use of information 
markets.  There is considerable variety in the information markets currently in use in organizations.  In a prediction 
market used at Best Buy, a common approach was taken: the price of shares were restricted to between $0 and 
$100 dollars, and the current stock price in a prediction was interpreted as an estimate of the probability of that 
prediction [Dvorak 2008].  In the idea market used at GE, another common technique, volume-weighted price was 
used to rank ideas, but those rankings were no better than leaders‘ expert ratings and rankings [LaComb et al. 
2007].  In an event market in which there are established, discrete choices, as in the presidential election markets, 
the voice of the market is the percentage of total number of choices made. 
Proposition 7:   Software cost estimation using information markets will be more accurate than 
existing methods of cost estimation. 
In this research area, there are also important research questions related to the use of information markets in the IS 
context.  For example, Hastie [2001, p. 666] notes that the phenomenon of unrealistic optimism operates in only two 
contexts, and one of them is ―judgments of cost and time to complete future multi-component projects.‖  Effort 
estimation in software development may benefit from the predictive ability of information markets, with both event 
markets and estimation markets being reasonable tools.  The software industry has a long history of inaccurate or 
inadequate estimation of the amount of effort required to complete projects.  The Standish Group has tracked 
software projects for the last two decades and their findings are dismal.  Their 2006 CHAOS report indicates that 
only 34 percent of software projects succeed, 51 percent came in late, over budget, or without the required 
functionality, and 15 percent failed – cancelled or finished but never used [Standish Group International 2006].  
Similarly, the Meta Group estimates only a 28 percent success rate [McBride 2005]. 
Experiments using groups of experts have resulted in more accurate and less biased estimates than single-expert 
estimates [Jorgensen and Molokken 2004].  This same idea, harnessing the collective minds of many experts, is the 
driving force behind the Delphi method.  Information markets provide a way to assemble the various opinions and 
judgments needed into a single estimation.  The Milestone Market (www.MilestoneMarket.org) is a prototype project 
management market built at the University of South Florida.  The market is being used to experiment with many of 
the research areas discussed in this paper, including the proposition that information markets are better than 
existing software cost estimation methods, especially over the life of a project.   
One of the markets used at Best Buy in 2007 and 2008 illustrates the usefulness of a market over time in project 
estimation.  In this interesting example, the likelihood of meeting the deadline began in December 2007 at 50 
percent (share price at $50), but by late January, the share price fell as participants realized the difficulty in meeting 
the deadline.  In response to the market value of the deadline-meeting contract, Best Buy revised its rollout plan, 
and by late February 2008, the share price of that contract had risen to $88.59, reflecting high confidence in meeting 
the project deadline [Dvorak 2008].  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper focuses on the emerging area of information markets that can be used to support large groups of 
geographically dispersed decision makers.  Information markets allow participants to buy and sell alternative 
outcomes in an effort to aggregate the diverse opinions of all participants.  These market-based decision-making 
technologies have the potential of democratizing many decision-making activities, allowing highly diverse and widely 
dispersed participants.  The idea that a potentially large collection of individuals can outperform a few specialized 
experts is still a somewhat radical proposition.  However, there does seem to be many areas in which expertise has 
limits.  In fact, information markets bring the ―centralized planning‖ versus the ―invisible hand‖ to the realm of 
decision making.  While there are certainly areas that seem better suited to individual experts, information markets 
and the wide-ranging information gathering activities of participants can be applied in many situations. 
The information market typology presented at the beginning of the paper (see Figure 1) organizes several different 
forms of market by the type of decision problem.  Prediction markets, both discrete event-based markets and 
estimation markets, focus on forecasting events that can be verified once the actual event occurs.  Decision markets 
are often used to choose among more complex alternatives and idea markets provide a market-based brainstorming 
environment.  Each of these markets require different mechanisms and trading interfaces for successful application. 
In addition to the market typology, the key constructs in the information market research topology (Figure 2.)—
individual trader characteristics, organization characteristics, market environment, external information, market 
design, trader behavior, and market outcomes—are identified and discussed.  These constructs and their 
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presented that describe how the research landscape model can be used to guide work on information markets.  
These propositions include those directed at market technology design and applications in the MIS context, such as 
software cost estimation.  Information markets promise to bring a new perspective to many decision-making tasks.  
A better understanding of trader characteristics, group dynamics in markets, and market design can help further 
information market applications. 
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